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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

30 November 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : The Outlook for Afghanistan *

1. In the light of increased policy concern over the trend of Afghan relations with the Soviet Bloc, we have initiated a new SNIE updating our last Afghan estimate, NIE 53-54, of 19 October 1954, for IAC consideration on 3 January. However, the old estimate appears to have been quite close to the mark in assessing the outlook for Afghanistan.

2. NIE 53-54 in essence concluded that Afghanistan was "highly vulnerable to Soviet pressures" and that its ability to remain an independent buffer state separating the USSR from the Indian subcontinent was being undermined as a result of Afghan receptivity to Soviet lures, particularly in the economic and technical assistance field. It estimated that Soviet attentions to Afghanistan -- as part of a general effort to counter Western gains elsewhere in the Middle East-South Asia area -- would "probably increase substantially" and that consequent Soviet economic

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* As revised pursuant to IAC comments made on 29 November.

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penetration might result in "a gradual drift of Afghanistan toward the Soviet orbit." It noted that "Afghanistan will probably continue to accept Soviet aid offers" and that "in doing so the Afghan leaders may misjudge their ability to curb Soviet political and subversive activity" and the willingness and ability of the Western powers to bail them out in event of a military or diplomatic crisis. Finally, NIE 53-54 pointed out that Afghan-Pakistani feuding -- which has played an important part in Afghanistan's receptivity to Soviet lures -- showed little promise of lessening.

3. NIE 53-54 nevertheless expressed the belief that the USSR was unlikely to gain actual control of Afghanistan, at least within the next few years. It estimated that the Afghan government's dealings with the Bloc were part of a continuing effort to play the great powers off against each other to Afghanistan's advantage and that Afghanistan would probably seek to obtain additional Western economic and possibly military aid to counterbalance assistance from the Bloc. It concluded that the USSR was unlikely to exercise its capability to take over Afghanistan militarily and that the small pro-Communist elements in Afghanistan would probably not gain sufficient strength to overthrow the government.

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4. Afghanistan's growing dependence on the Soviet Bloc during the past year has underlined the dangers foreseen in the estimate. The NIE noted that Afghanistan had received the equivalent of more than \$11 million in Bloc credits, together with technical assistance, for development projects. Another \$10 million credit has now reportedly been extended by Czechoslovakia. Deliveries of arms from Czechoslovakia under a \$3 million cash deal are already being made. The Soviets have reportedly even offered to take over and complete the American-financed and directed Helmand Valley project, the country's largest development project.* Afghan barter trade with the Bloc has been increasing. Finally, the Afghan government is taking steps to reduce its vulnerability to Pakistani economic sanctions by rerouting the bulk of its foreign trade, both with the West and the Bloc, through the USSR rather than via the traditional routes through Pakistan.

5. These growing ties with the Soviet Bloc -- which will almost certainly be strengthened during the forthcoming Khrushchev-Bulganin visit -- probably result not from a deliberate Afghan decision to

* Total US loans and technical and economic aid to Afghanistan since 1949 has been approximately \$50 million. This includes two Export-Import Bank loans for the Helmand River project (\$21 million in 1949, and \$18.2 million in 1954) and some \$8 million in technical assistance.

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abandon its historic policy of non-commitment, but from Afghanistan's estrangement from Pakistan. As forecast in our estimate, Afghan Prime Minister Daud has continued to court trouble with Pakistan over the Pushtun question. A crisis arose early this year when an officially inspired Kabul mob, demonstrating in the cause of Pushtunistan, entered and damaged the Pakistani embassy. The incident convinced the Pakistanis that Daud would have to go, and Pakistan's blockade of Afghan trade from April to September of this year was aimed in part at forcing Daud out. Far from doing so, however, the Pakistani challenge has apparently strengthened Daud and increased his determination to keep up the Pushtun feud with Pakistan and to cultivate Bloc support in the controversy. The recent Loe Jirgah (Grand Tribal Assembly) appears to have firmly endorsed Daud's stand.

6. Thus the Afghan obsession with the Pushtunistan question plays into the hands of the Soviets whose assistance to the Afghans makes it possible for the latter to press the Pushtunistan agitation with greater safety. The Bloc can offer Afghanistan something the West cannot -- an alternative to complete dependence on Pakistan for trade outlets by making available transit facilities through the USSR and by itself providing increasing quantities of essential imports, such

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as petroleum products, which Afghanistan formerly obtained through Pakistan. These favors, which costs the Soviet Union very little, are probably valued by the Afghans as highly as the Egyptians value the arms with which they are being provided by the Soviet Union at equally negligible cost to the Soviets. The Soviet Union could, if it so desired, aid Afghanistan in promoting agitation over Pushtunistan by providing money, arms, and diplomatic support in the UN. Moreover, its treaties with Afghanistan provide a good basis for a Soviet guarantee of the Kabul regime against any retaliatory acts by Pakistan.

7. We believe that the basic dangers in the Afghan situation remain substantially as depicted in NIE 53-54. However, the deterioration in Afghan-Pakistani relations during 1955 has given Daud additional incentive to seek Bloc assistance in strengthening his position vis-a-vis Pakistan and has thus accelerated the Afghan drift toward the Bloc. While the Daud government almost certainly remains desirous of maintaining its independence, its apparent determination to pursue its anti-Pakistan policies at almost any cost has already led it to compromise its traditional buffer state position in important respects. If present trends continue, Afghanistan may fall into the "Soviet camp" even though remaining nominally independent. In the presently unlikely

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event that Afghan-Pakistani hostilities should develop, the Daud government would probably seek extensive Soviet support without regard to the political cost.

8. The USSR, for its part, is probably content to have Afghanistan remain nominally independent so long as the latter's tendency to drift away from the West and toward the Bloc continues. As a result, the Soviet Union is unlikely to take early action to secure firm control of Afghanistan, either by subversion or direct military intervention. However, it will almost certainly act vigorously to maintain its present favorable position. It would probably give Daud strong support against any efforts to unseat him or in the event of major Afghan-Pakistani hostilities. The forthcoming Khrushchev-Bulganin visit will probably lead to a joint statement in favor of peaceful coexistence and non-interference, but the Soviets may go so far as to offer Daud a specific security guarantee.

9. Should Afghanistan fall under Soviet control, considerable political and psychological damage to the position of the free world in the area would result. Moreover, the extension of the Communist


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Bloc to the borders of Pakistan would place the Communists in direct contact with the tribal areas where they could promote serious subversive action against Pakistan.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:



SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

61-9102

SECRET ENCLOSURE

22 NOV 1961

MEMORANDUM

00-6754-01

FOR: The Honorable
Allen Dulles
Director
Central Intelligence Agency

FROM: L. D. Battle *OK*
Executive Secretary

I enclose for your information a copy of Ambassador Merchant's report on his recent mission to Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Enclosure:

Cy of Amb. Merchant's
report, 11/16/61.

(SECRET)

[Handwritten signature]

SECRET ENCLOSURE

This Document consists of 6 pages

-----No. 1 of 7 copies series A-----

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

att to ER 61-9102

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18058

TO: The Secretary
S/S
THROUGH: NSA - Phillips Talbot *(P)*

DATE: November 16, 1961

FROM: Livingston T. Merchant *LT Merchant*

SUBJECT: Conclusions and Recommendations Resulting from my Visit to Pakistan and Afghanistan from Oct. 19 to Nov. 8, 1961, as the Personal Representative of the President of the United States for the Exercise of his Good Offices in Connection with the Stoppage of Transit Traffic to and from Afghanistan through Pakistan.

It seems to me unnecessary to summarize my numerous reports to you during the period of my mission. Accordingly, I am confining this final report to my conclusions and recommendations for the future with respect to this problem. What follows reflects my oral report to you and later to President Kennedy at the White House on the afternoon of November 10, during which call Mr. Talbot was also present.

For convenience sake I am attaching a record of my itinerary (Tab A) and a chronological listing of my reports by telegram and despatch from the area (Tab B).

Before setting forth my conclusions, I might usefully record the character of my reception in the two countries.

In Pakistan, President Ayub, Foreign Minister Qadir, and all officials with whom I talked treated me with extreme cordiality and friendliness throughout. President Ayub and Mr. Qadir, however, from the outset were frank in saying that, greatly as they appreciated President Kennedy's friendly interest in this matter, they considered the timing of the President's offer of good offices and my consequent visit to be premature. They expressed the fear that this would be interpreted by the Afghans as undue anxiety on the part of the United States and would lead to increased rather than lessened intransigence on the part of the Afghans. Nonetheless, they expressed the desire loyally to cooperate with the United States and in good faith attempt to make my mission a success.

I was received in Afghanistan by the King, the Prime Minister, and the Foreign Minister with equal warmth and friendliness. All of them seemed genuinely grateful for this mark of President Kennedy's personal

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interest in Afghanistan. From the outset they made clear that whatever the outcome of my mission, they would always remember with pleasure receiving me as the President's personal representative.

I did my utmost during the course of my time spent in the two countries and in my final talks with both governments to assure that my failure to achieve any concrete result neither ended the continuing exercise of good offices in the matter by President Kennedy nor in any way diminished the understanding and friendship on the part of the United States for each country. I do not believe that my visit, in fact, worsened in any way the situation as I found it or impaired our relationship with either government.

Conclusions:

1. Wise and desirable as it was to seek to deal with the problem of transit in isolation, the fact is that the transit traffic through Pakistan and the modalities under which it moves are inextricably involved in the attitudes and policies of Pakistan and Afghanistan, respectively, with regard to the "Pushtunistan" question. This fact accounts for the lack of total frankness as to underlying motives and attitudes which I found in my talks with both parties. It underlies, for example, the willingness of the Government of Pakistan to go to some inconvenience and even expense to shift physically the point of delivery for transit goods from Peshawar, the traditional railhead, to the Afghan border or at least as far as the Khyber Pass. Similarly, though for different reasons, it underlies the Afghan refusal to consider such an arrangement, notwithstanding the fact that convenience, the simplifying of paper work, and the rational operation of transit traffic through one country to another all argue forcefully for such an arrangement for shipment in bond. The Afghans regard the Durand Line as dividing Afghanistan from "occupied Pushtunistan" and not as its border with Pakistan. However, all logistic sense is on the side of a border delivery point on the Peshawar route under physical arrangements directly comparable to those already in existence on the Chaman route.

2. I do not believe that Afghanistan, either by choice or by the present degree of its exposure to Soviet infiltration and influence, has yet reached the point of no return as an independent country, free from alignment with the Soviet bloc. Neither do I believe that in a few months the Afghans will be irretrievably lost, even if the stoppage of transit traffic through Pakistan continues for that period with the resultant reduction of visible American presence and the virtual elimination of commercial contact with the free world. A permanent

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closure of the transit route through Pakistan or its blockage for a year or more would, however, give the Soviets a virtually free field in which to operate their highly sophisticated, many faceted apparatus for gaining control and, as a consequence, reduce any later chance or opportunity for us to help Afghanistan recover genuine independence.

3. Pakistan is a stout ally of the United States, effectively cooperating with us in many areas of the greatest importance to our own national security. It is consequently my strong view that we should never pursue policies with respect to Afghanistan which would undermine the loyalty and reliability of Pakistan as an ally.

4. I found, or in some cases sensed, certain miscalculations and illusions in the background of the policies of each government. These I sought to dispel, I believe with some success. With respect to Afghanistan, they were:

a. That the United States was so attached to its aid program to Afghanistan either for its own sake or because of its desire to call and raise any aid offer by the Soviets to any neutral country that it would put sufficient pressure on the Government of Pakistan to force the reopening of the transit traffic on Afghan terms;

b. That if the present prospect of no immediate reopening of the transit route through Pakistan forces the United States to reduce or eliminate its economic aid program to Afghanistan, the program could be restored, in its present form, with no difficulty and little delay at some period in the distant future when the route did reopen;

c. That historical Afghan tactics of playing the great powers off against each other can work with the same success against the sophisticated methods of the Soviet government as they did against the Czarist regime.

5. With respect to Pakistan, these miscalculations and illusions were:

a. That the United States might be contemplating placing on the Government of Pakistan unacceptable pressures to pursue a course of policy in action with respect to Afghanistan which the Pakistanis genuinely believed to be unwise and contrary to their own security interest. Such pressure by the United States would pose a basic problem to the Government of Pakistan in maintaining public support for its policies.

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Moreover, while the expression of public opinion is not today in Pakistan the force that it is in the United States, the Ayub government is beginning to move from an authoritarian regime toward greater freedoms under the forthcoming new constitution. To that extent, the government must take into greater account public emotions and attitudes than has been the case in the past three years. In this connection what the Pakistanis refer to as Afghanistan's "Pushtunistan stunt" has a genuine and high emotional content for many Pakistanis outside as well as in the government;

b. That if Ayub's tactics with respect to the present difficulties with the Afghans later bring the latter "to their knees," the United States would be able promptly and easily to meet an Afghan call for help by restoring a large aid program which the blockade on transit had gravely reduced or, indeed, ended.

6. Both governments are to blame for the present impasse with respect to transit traffic. The Afghans, however, must, in my judgment, bear the major share of the blame. If they have not, in fact, perversely and for reasons of face blockaded themselves, at least they have stubbornly refused to test the public assurances and protestations by the Government of Pakistan of its willingness to permit the actual movement of freight on the transit route. Moreover, I consider that the only significant concessions made with a view to arriving at a workable modus vivendi on transit came from the Pakistanis.

7. That a solution to this problem through the continuing exercise of good offices by the United States is by no means hopeless. I think that my talks sharpened the issues, improved the basis for devising an effective formula, and are currently forcing both governments seriously to re-examine their respective policies in the matter. The passage of a little time (and I am thinking in terms of three or four weeks) now seems to me an essential element in preparing the ground for the second, and, I would hope, successful effort for us to play an effective role in solving this problem.

Recommendations:

1. That our good offices in the next round be exercised through Ambassadors Rountree and Byroade in a concerted approach, each to the government to which he is accredited, along lines to be devised by the Department in consultation with our two Ambassadors.

2. That we not contemplate penalizing the Government of Pakistan in the treatment we give it in respect to aid or in any other area but

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that we continue to leave them in no doubt that we seriously disagree with the wisdom of their current tactics for dealing with Afghanistan however completely we share a common purpose and objective.

3. That we similarly continue to deal in friendly fashion with the Afghans.

4. That we promptly reach decisions with respect to the size and character of our existing economic aid program to Afghanistan on the assumption that the transit route through Karachi is unlikely to be reopened earlier than two or three months hence. I strongly believe we should keep going as much of the program as can be logistically supported, without extravagant transport costs, either by air or by the route through Iran via Meshed. This will entail a project by project review on which the recommendations of Ambassador Byroade and the USOM in Kabul will be of great value. Some projects may necessitate cancellation; others may be susceptible to mothballing; still others now in the last stages of completion might be feasibly carried to conclusion, even at considerable added transport cost. Certainly, programs such as in the educational field, where people rather than tonnage are important, should be maintained and extended as opportunities can be developed. Ambassador Byroade should be kept currently informed of decisions in process in Washington so that he is enabled to keep the Afghan Government currently apprised of the sad, progressive and inexorable consequences of the blocked transit route.

5. That we not give, under existing circumstances, consideration to the construction, at U. S. Government expense, of a new rail or road route into Afghanistan through Iran. For the decades ahead and on the twin assumptions that Afghanistan shows an effective desire to remain free and survives the dangerous phase through which it is now passing, the creation of such a third major route of access makes sense. Under current conditions, however, it would be a reckless project for the United States to support. It could neither come into operation in time to deal with the crisis now hovering over Afghanistan nor would a start on its construction contribute to putting pressure on either Afghanistan or Pakistan to get the Karachi route reopened.

6. That serious thought be given to urging the Federal Republic of Germany to use the Soviet overland transit route to Afghanistan for the shipment of materials necessary for the various German projects scheduled or underway in Afghanistan. Despite obvious unattractive political aspects of doing this, it would at least keep some substantial Western economic presence in Afghanistan.

7. That no

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7. That no Presidential message to Ayub or the King or both be sent, at least until the tactics for the next assault on the problem have been determined.

In conclusion, it goes without saying that I have been honored by the confidence you and the President have shown by having designated me for this purpose, that I am regretful that I was unable to achieve any demonstrable result, and that I am readily available to come to Washington from Ottawa at any time my presence in the Department would be considered helpful in the formulation of future moves.

Attachments:

Tab A - Itinerary

Tab B - Chronological listing of reports
(SECRET and LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

LTMerchant:paj:11/11/61

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Chronology, Itinerary and Substantive Aspects of Good Offices Mission to Afghanistan and Pakistan (including social events of an official nature)

- 10/16/61 (Mon.) Departed Washington via National and Pan American Airways to Istanbul with Mrs. Merchant and Spengler.
- 10/17/61 (Tue.) Arrived Istanbul for day of rest.
- 10/18/61 (Wed.) Proceeded to Karachi via Pan American Airways.
- 10/19/61 (Thu.) Arrived Karachi (early morning).
Paid courtesy call on Pakistan Foreign Secretary DEHLAVI (afternoon).
- 10/20/61 (Fri.) Proceeded to Rawalpindi via PIA with Amb. Rountree, Mrs. Merchant and Spengler.
Conferred with President AYUB KHAN and members of the Pakistan Cabinet (late morning).
Conferred with Foreign Minister QADIR and colleagues (noon).
Entertained by Foreign Minister QADIR at lunch at his residence.
Prepared reports on aforementioned meetings (afternoon).
Entertained by President AYUB KHAN at small reception at his residence (evening).
Attended dinner given by Amb. Rountree for Foreign Minister QADIR and members of the Pakistan Cabinet at ICA Staff House (evening).
- 10/21/61 (Sat.) Completed reports (morning).
Proceeded to Peshawar by Consulate car with Mrs. Merchant and Spengler (afternoon).
Arrived Peshawar (evening).
- 10/22/61 (Sun.) Visited Cantonment and City railway yards and storage areas in Peshawar to inspect condition of transit goods being held there (morning). Accompanied by Deputy Director of Operations, PWR, ZAMAN and staff.
Visited Khyber Pass with Brigadier RAHMAN GUL, IGFC; Political Agent Khyber AYUB; and Consul Makepeace.
Lunched at Khyber Rifles Mess. Viewed Khyber Railway and Afghan border from top of pass (afternoon).
Gave off-the-record interview to Paul GRIMES, New York Times correspondent (evening).

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- 10/22/61 (Sun.) (Continued) Called on Air Marshal ASGHAR KHAN, C-in-C of the PAF, and Begum Khan (evening).
Dined at Consulate with members of official American community.
- 10/23/61 (Mon.) Proceeded to Kabul via Karachi Air Attache plane with Mrs. Merchant and Spengler (noon). Required to fly Peshawar-D.I.K.-Ghazni-Kabul corridor.
Arrived Kabul (afternoon). Conferred with Ambassador Byroade and DCM Hannah.
- 10/24/61 (Tue.) Conferred with Afghan Foreign Minister NAIM (morning).
Audience with King ZAHIR SHAH (late morning).
Conferred with Prime Minister DAUD (afternoon).
Entertained by Foreign Minister NAIM at dinner at Chilsatan Palace with Cabinet members and RGA officials (evening).
- 10/25/61 (Wed.) Prepared reports at chancery (morning).
Entertained by Deputy Foreign Minister SULEIMAN at lunch at Paghman.
Departed Kabul for Karachi by Kabul Air Attache plane (afternoon).
Arrived Karachi (evening).
- 10/26/61 (Thu.) Conferred with Ambassador Rountree and Acting DCM Linebaugh.
Began drafting proposal to be submitted to GOP and RGA.
- 10/27/61 (Fri.) Continued preparation of draft proposal.
- 10/28/61 (Sat.) Completed proposal and cabled text to Department for review.

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- 10/23/61 (Sat.) (Continued) Received Foreign Secretary DEHLAVI at Ambassador's residence for discussion of plans for proceeding with mission (evening).
- Attended dinner by Ambassador Rountree for outgoing Pakistan Chief of Protocol, Air Commodore RABB.
- 10/29/61 (Sun.) Studied Department's comments and suggestions on draft proposal.
- 10/30/61 (Mon.) Called on Foreign Secretary DEHLAVI, accompanied by Ambassador Rountree, to inform him of draft proposal (morning).
- Proceeded to Rawalpindi by Karachi Air Attache plane with Ambassador Rountree and Spengler (noon).
- Re-worked draft proposal while awaiting appointments with GOP officials (afternoon).
- 10/31/61 (Tue.) Conferred with Foreign Minister QADIR during working lunch at State Guest House (afternoon).
- Prepared re-draft of proposal (evening).
- 11/1/61 (Wed.) Presented revised proposal to Foreign Minister QADIR (late morning).
- Discussed revised proposal with President AYUB KHAN and Foreign Minister QADIR (noon).
- Discussed in further detail the revised proposal with Foreign Minister QADIR at working lunch (afternoon).
- Revised proposal further in accordance with preceding discussion (evening).
- Delivered revised proposal to Foreign Minister QADIR who telephoned his concurrence (late evening).
- 11/2/61 (Thu.) Proceeded to Kabul via Karachi Air Attache plane with Spengler; delayed due to mechanical trouble (noon).
- Arrived Kabul (afternoon). Conferred with Ambassador Byroade.

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- 11/2/61 (Thu.) Called on Foreign Minister NAIM and presented proposal
(Continued) (afternoon).

Co-hosted dinner with Ambassador Byroade for Foreign Minister NAIM and members of the Afghan Cabinet and Government.
- 11/3/61 (Fri.) Holiday in Afghanistan. Prepared reports at chancery.

Entertained by USOM Director Schwartz at dinner with USOM section chiefs and other key aid program officials.
- 11/4/61 (Sat.) Prepared proposed departure statement and other reports at chancery, and cabled statement to Dept. (morning).

Conferred with Foreign Minister NAIM and received RCA counterproposal (afternoon).
- 11/5/61 (Sun.) Proceeded to Karachi via Kabul Air Attache plane (morning).

Arrived Karachi (afternoon). Prepared and cabled to Department tentative conclusions and recommendations.
- 11/6/61 (Mon.) Called on Foreign Minister QADIR at Foreign Office for final discussion (morning).

Prepared for departure from Karachi.

Arranged for simultaneous release of approved departure statement through USIS in Karachi and Kabul with embargo to 12:05 a.m., 11/7/61.
- 11/7/61 (Tue.) Received instruction from Department to delay departure pending receipt of further instructions (early morning, too late to recall departure statement).

Requested Secretary's permission to depart for Washington following day (morning). Received permission (late evening).
- 11/8/61 (Wed.) Departed Karachi for London by BOAC (morning).

Arrived London for day of rest and call at U. S. Embassy (evening).

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11/9/61 (Thu.) Proceeded to New York and Washington via Pan American and National Airlines (evening).
Arrived in Washington (late evening).

11/10-11/61 Consultation in Washington. Conferred with the President, the Secretary, and officials of NEA. Prepared final report.

WFSpengler:pa.j
11/13/61

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List of Reports Submitted to the Department by
Ambassador Merchant in Connection with his
Good Offices Mission to Afghanistan and Pakistan

Note: All telegrams and despatches listed
in this document are classified SECRET and
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<u>Subject</u>	<u>Report</u>
Conversation with the President, 10/16/61.	Memcon, 10/16/61.
Initial conversation with Pakistan Foreign Secretary DEHLAVI, Karachi, 10/19/61.	Karachi's Tel. 726, 10/19/61 (CONFIDENTIAL).
Conversations with GOP officials, Rawalpindi, 10/20/61.	Karachi's Tel. 735, 10/21/61 (General summary).
Conversation with President AYUB KHAN and members of Pakistan Cabinet, Rawalpindi, 10/20/61.	Karachi's Tel. 737, 10/21/61 (telegraphic summary). Karachi's D-281, 10/26/61 (Enclosure 1 - full memcon).
Conversation with Pakistan Foreign Minister QADIR, Rawalpindi, 10/20/61.	Karachi's Tel. 738, 10/21/61 (telegraphic summary). Karachi's D-281, 10/26/61 (Enclosure 2 - full memcon).
Private conversation with President AYUB KHAN, Rawalpindi, 10/20/61.	Karachi's Tel. 768, 10/26/61 (telegraphic summary). Karachi's D-281, 10/26/61 (Enclosure 3 - full memcon).
Conversations with RGA officials, Kabul, 10/24/61.	Kabul's Tel. 314, 10/24/61 (general summary).
Conversation with Afghan Foreign Minister NAIM, Kabul, 10/24/61.	Kabul's Tel. 317, 10/25/61 (telegraphic summary). Kabul's D-___, 10/ /61 (full memcon; not received in Department by 11/11/61).
Audience with King ZAHIR SHAH, Kabul, 10/24/61.	(To be reported by Ambassador Byroade by despatch).

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Conversation with Prime Minister DAUD, Kabul, 10/24/61.	Kabul's Tel. 318, 10/26/61 (telegraphic summary) Karachi's D-282, 10/27/61 (full memcon)
Brief report on proposed procedure for second round of talks with GOP and RGA.	Karachi's Tel. 771, 10/27/61.
Report on substance of proposed approaches to GOP and RGA in second round.	Karachi's Tel. 772, 10/27/61.
Texts of draft proposals which Ambassador Merchant planned to present to GOP and RGA.	Karachi's D-284, 10/30/61 (transmitting texts)
Brief report of trend in second round of talks, Rawalpindi, 10/31/61.	Karachi's Tel. 790, 11/1/61.
Telegraphic summary of second round of talks with GOP officials, Rawalpindi, 10/31/61 and 11/1/61.	Karachi's Tel. 798, 11/2/61.
Conversations with Pakistan Foreign Secretary DEHLAVI, Karachi, 10/28/61 and 10/30/61.	Karachi's D-296, 11/3/61 (Enclosures 1 and 2 - full memcons).
Conversation with Foreign Minister QADIR, Rawalpindi, 10/31/61.	Kabul's D-81, 11/4/61.
Conversation with Foreign Minister QADIR, Rawalpindi, morning of 11/1/61.	Karachi's D-303, 11/6/61 (Enclosure 1 - full memcon)
Conversation with President AYUB KHAN, Rawalpindi, 11/1/61 (noon).	Karachi's D-303, 11/6/61 (Enclosure 2 - full memcon).
Conversation with Foreign Minister QADIR, Rawalpindi, afternoon of 11/1/61.	Karachi's D-303, 11/6/61 (Enclosure 3 - full memcon)
Text of letter to Foreign Minister, 11/1/61, enclosing revised draft proposal.	Karachi's D-296, 11/3/61 (transmitting text)

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Telegraphic report of trend of second round of talks with RGA, Kabul, 11/2/61.	Kabul's Tel. 331, 11/3/61.
Conversation with Afghan Foreign Minister NAM, Kabul, 11/2/61.	Kabul's Tel. 332, 11/3/61 (telegraphic summary) Kabul's D-80, 11/4/61 (full memcon).
Comment on Deptel 177 regarding proposed Presidential letter.	Kabul's Tel. 333, 11/3/61.
Conversation with Foreign Minister NAM, Kabul, 11/4/61.	Kabul's Tel. 336, 11/4/61 (Ambassador Merchant's assessment). Kabul's Tel. 338, 11/5/61 (telegraphic summary). Karachi's D-___, 11/6/61 (Enclosure 1 - full memcon; not received in Department by 11/11/61).
Brief conversation with Afghan Foreign Ministry official, Kabul, 11/5/61.	Karachi's D-___, 11/6/61 (full memcon).
Text of proposed departure statement by Ambassador Merchant.	Kabul's Tel. 337, 11/4/61 (transmitting text).
Report on proposed procedure for concluding good offices mission.	Karachi's Tel. 816, 11/6/61.
Final conversation with Pakistan Foreign Minister ADER, Karachi, 11/6/61.	Karachi's Tel. 821, 11/6/61 (brief summary). Karachi's Tel. 830, 11/7/61 (full telegraphic summary). Karachi's D-___, _____ (full memcon; not received in Department by 11/11/61).
Final telegraphic reports from Karachi concerning conclusion of mission and issuance of departure statement.	Karachi's Tels. 826 and 828, 11/7/61.
Conversation with the President, 11/10/61.	Memcon, 11/10/61.
Final report to the Secretary, 11/11/61.	Memorandum to the Secretary through NEA, 11/11/61.

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RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.

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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM 20/20

STATION WJLA-TV
ABC Network

DATE February 17, 1983 10:00 P.M. CITY Washington, D.C.

SUBJECT Desertion In Soviet Army

HUGH DOWNS: Tonight a most unusual report about rare event: desertion by troops of the Soviet Army, Russian soldiers caught in a seemingly endless fight against the Moslem rebels in Afghanistan.

Just within the past week, the rebels made the latest in a series of devastating attacks on Russian-held airfields, further demoralizing Soviet troops, who thought in the beginning they faced an easy enemy.

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is in its fourth year. You remember the events. Christmas Eve of 1979. Russian tanks and troops airlifted to Kabul, the capital. Now there are more than 105,000 troops in Afghanistan. You recall the world turmoil over the invasion. There were United Nations resolutions demanding withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan.

MAN: In favor, 104. Against, 18.

DOWNS: You remember the curtailment of American grain sales to Russia, the boycott of the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow. And now, increasing reports of Russian atrocities, the mass murder of innocent civilians, and continuing charges of Russian use of chemical warfare.

More than three million Afghans have fled to neighboring Pakistan, one-fifth of the population of Afghanistan. That's the

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largest group of refugees in the world. And the rebels, bolder now and better-armed, are successfully attacking Russian convoys and threatening Soviet-controlled cities. Western intelligence sources estimate Russian casualties at 12 to 15 thousand dead and wounded. Even in the Soviet press, where losses are rarely admitted, there are reports of casualties and stories of hardship for Russian troops in Afghanistan.

And now, something unseen since World War II, Soviet troops deserting, going over to the Afghan rebels. ABC News correspondent Bill Redeker is just back from Afghanistan.

BILL REDEKER: Hugh, we left Afghanistan last week after interviewing several Soviet deserters in a remote mountain stronghold. The camp is located near Kandahar, Afghanistan's second-largest city. The camp is a safe haven controlled by Afghan rebels known as the Mujahidin.

The Mujahidin, holy warriors, praising Allah at a rear-echelon camp in southeast Afghanistan. But look closely, for among them normally atheistic Russian soldiers, defectors who've surrendered to the Afghan rebels: Sergei Mishilokov (?), 26, private. Grisha Sulimanov (?), 20, sergeant. Akram Faisulaiev (?), 20, private. Feyodor Kosinov (?), 20, private. There are other Soviet POWs at this camp. But unlike their comrades here, they've refused to adopt the ways of their Moslem captors. For them, a locked door and an armed guard.

Alexander Zerikovsky (?), 21, sergeant. Valery Kisalov (?), 20, private. Like the others, they deserted, claiming they were misled by their army, which they say commits atrocities in Afghanistan.

TRANSLATOR: Officers told us that Afghanistan is full of foreign mercenaries, and we have to help Afghanistan people to fight that aggression. But it was a pure lie. What aggression? I did not see any aggression here, only Afghanistan people who took arms in their hands to protect their own country. That's all.

REDEKER: To begin with, Sergei, explain to me, why did you leave the Soviet troops and join the Mujahidin here in Afghanistan?

TRANSLATOR: Because I do not want to kill women and children, because the Soviet troops are killing everything that is alive in Afghanistan.

[Unintelligible] realized that this were ordinary people from the settlements. The actual people are Afghanistan.

We were fighting with them. And then it's not so good, I thought, to kill such innocent children and adults. Bombing and killing them is not good.

REDEKER: How widespread is the killing of women and children that you mentioned earlier?

TRANSLATOR: How widespread the practice is, I don't know. They kill everything without count, with any kind of weapon.

REDEKER: What can you tell me about the reported use by the Soviets of chemical warfare?

TRANSLATOR: Yes. When I was going to Khorban (?), I saw pretty good holes with diameters of two meters or so and a meter and a half deep. The soil -- the soil was red there. I don't know. Actually, I'm not a chemist. There are chemical units that they are using the weapons here. That is to say, the Army has chemical units everywhere. The infantry has them. The paratroops. Even the Air Force has its specialists in that field.

REDEKER: For those POWs who agree, daily language instruction and lessons from the Moslem holy book, the Koran. In short, indoctrination by the Mujahidin. In return, these prisoners are allowed more freedom than the others, permitted to roam freely about the camp, and encouraged to join the insurgents in their battles against a Soviet Army increasingly plagued by poor morale.

What is the morale of those soldiers from the Soviet Union now fighting here in Afghanistan?

TRANSLATOR: Not very good. They just have to follow the orders they get from their commanders.

REDEKER: Why isn't the morale very good?

TRANSLATOR: How can I put it? In general, the soldiers don't want to fight with the Afghan people. Nobody wants to fight. All soldiers want to go home to the Soviet Union. Nobody wants to fight. No one. It is better to go back to the Soviet Union and serve prison terms. Nobody wants to fight here in this country.

REDEKER: Valery, why do people feel that way? Why do soldiers and their commanders feel that way?

TRANSLATOR: Well, there are some officers, very bad officers. What attracts them? Why do they come here? They are usually just from a military school. They have to be in the Army for 25 years. And here, one year is counted as two. While back in the Soviet Union, one year is one year. That's the main reason why they want to be here. But there are some officers who do not want to fight here. I cannot tell why they don't want to fight here. I think that some of them are very honest, good people, and they have learned the truth. They want to live in peace with Afghanistan, in peace. They don't want to fight.

REDEKER: What about illicit drugs? For instance, hashish.

TRANSLATOR: It is usually used by the soldiers.

REDEKER: How do they obtain it?

TRANSLATOR: They trade it for their personal belongings, sometimes even ammunition.

REDEKER: What do the people of the Soviet Union think about what's happening in this country?

TRANSLATOR: The Soviet people don't think anything. They don't know who we are fighting. Is it the people of Afghanistan or someone else?

Well, there must be some people now who know. The ones who are demobilized, they explain. They tell those who listen.

The newspapers and television in the Soviet Union are lying to us about Afghanistan. When the Soviet soldier returns home he is sworn not to say a word of what he has seen or done, not a word. He's not to speak to anybody about it, about Afghanistan in general, no matter how some people try to fish for information. The soldier could break down when he's drunk. Yes, that's quite possible. But every soldier is strictly warned about this.

REDEKER: While life is primitive at the Mujahidin camp, all of the prisoners say they receive enough food, though their diet is bland and consists mainly of bread, rice and tea. Medical facilities are also limited, but adequate to treat superficial wounds and mild illnesses.

Despite the humane treatment at this camp, Soviet prisoners being held elsewhere may not be as fortunate. In fact, some Mujahidin leaders have told ABC News that if the maintenance

of Soviet prisoners becomes a burden, as it did a few years ago, they will return to their earlier practice of executing their Russian captives.

Akmatiar Golbadin (?) is the leader of Hesbi Islami (?) Afghanistan, one of the most powerful forces of Mujahidin fighters.

AKMATIAR GOLBADIN: If Mujuahidin realize that keeping the prisoners alive, it then creates problems and it is useless, without any result, they will not put themselves in danger. So they will decide to punish them.

REDEKER: Zafaradin Khan (?), regional commander of the Hesbi forces in southern Afghanistan, is directly responsible for the prisoners held in his camp. However, the 27-year-old leader disagrees with his chief and vows he will not execute Russian POWs.

ZAFARADIN KHAN [translated]: There are some Russians who surrendered themselves to Moslem forces and took refuge in Islam. They should be treated like any other Mujahidin. As Moslems enjoy certain rights, so should these Russians enjoy such rights.

The second group are those who did not show any willingness to become Moslems. They enjoy complete freedom of opinion and are left alone.

REDEKER: Is there any set of circumstances under which you would consider executing them?

KHAN [translated]: No. As regards this question, we absolutely follow the Islamic commandments.

REDEKER: For now, these are the lucky ones. They are alive and relatively secure. But the future of these Russian prisoners has been jeopardized by their own government. Recently, the Mujahidin agreed to release seven Soviets to the International Committee of the Red Cross for temporary internment in Switzerland before repatriation to the Soviet Union. In exchange, Moscow agreed to allow the Red Cross to visit Mujahidin prisoners. But the Russians broke their word and expelled the Red Cross from Afghanistan. Now it is doubtful that the Afghan rebels will turn over any more prisoners. These POWs have become victims of a Russian double-cross.

What do you want to do now?

6

TRANSLATOR: I want to go, if it is possible, to America. Because in the Soviet Union they will put me away.

REDEKER: What about your family in the Soviet Union? Don't you want to go back and see your relatives, your home?

TRANSLATOR: Well, I'd like to, but it won't be possible. It's difficult.

REDEKER: Why to America?

TRANSLATOR: 'Cause there, although the Soviet Union says that America is very bad, radio and other sources indicate that there the people lead a more civilized life. They understand what they are doing. They also do not want war, in Afghanistan or other places.

REDEKER: Do you now consider yourself a traitor to the Soviet Union?

TRANSLATOR: Well, that's how it has come out, a traitor. But we don't think we are traitors.

Yes, I want to return to the Soviet Union because it is my home. My parents are waiting for me. I was born there. That's my homeland. I want to go home.

REDEKER: But no doubt you'll be considered a traitor and you'll be dealt with severely for that?

TRANSLATOR: Yes, they'll treat me badly if I go back to the Soviet Union. Well, people are unaware of what is really going on here. Now if I come back, I don't know what the future has in store for me.

What do I want? I also want to go back to the Soviet Union. I don't care what happens to me there. I don't care. I want to return home. I'm not interested in anything else but home.

DOWNS: How many Soviet soldiers are the rebels holding, Bill?

REDEKER: Hugh, the best guess has between 150 and 200 Soviet POWs now in detention in Afghanistan. And I should point out that just today Freedom House, a U.S. organization supportive of Soviet dissidents, which first brought these prisoners to our attention, asked Secretary of State George Shultz's help in getting these prisoners to the United States.

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

14 September 1983

Pakistan: Steadfastness on Afghanistan

Pakistani leaders view the Soviet presence in Afghanistan as a strategic threat. They believe, [redacted] the Soviets want to gain permanent overland access to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean littoral. They are worried that Moscow will increase its political and military pressure on Pakistan once it has consolidated its hold on Afghanistan. [redacted]

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[redacted] they are concerned that Moscow will collaborate with India to neutralize and divide Pakistan--perhaps by a combination of external military pressure and subversive meddling in Pakistan's unstable domestic politics. [redacted]

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We believe Pakistan continues to engage the Soviets in periodic talks on Afghanistan for a number of reasons:

- The UN-sponsored talks provide Pakistan both with a way to test Soviet intentions in Afghanistan and maintain international support for its position on Afghanistan.
- Pakistan keeps its channels open to Moscow because it worries that the West will in time forget about Afghanistan or reach an agreement over Pakistan's head as part of a larger East-West settlement.
- The refugee problem inside Pakistan has become a major concern to Islamabad. Rising local resentments and concern in the Army that some 3 million Afghan refugees will become a permanent burden for Pakistan have added a note of urgency to Pakistan's search for a political settlement. So far, however, relations between the Afghan refugees and locals--who belong to the same ethnic group--have been peaceful. [redacted]

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This memorandum was prepared by the South Asia Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, [redacted] Information as of September 12, 1983 was used in preparation of this paper. Comments and queries are welcome and should be addressed to Chief, South Asia Division, [redacted]

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We doubt Islamabad is ready to shift its stand on the issue in ways that would damage US interests. So far in the indirect talks at Geneva, Pakistan has remained steadfast in its insistence that a political settlement is contingent on a withdrawal of Soviet troops.

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- Islamabad supports the Afghan insurgents in order to make it more difficult for the Soviets to consolidate their hold on Afghanistan. An active insurgency is crucial to Pakistan's diplomatic campaign to keep Afghanistan before world opinion as an issue that can be settled only by the withdrawal of Soviet troops.
- A political settlement acceptable to the Zia regime would have to permit the voluntary return to Afghanistan of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Islamabad knows the refugees will not return home unless the Soviets first withdraw their troops.
- Pakistan has consistently refused to recognize the Babrak regime. Islamabad knows that recognition is its trump card. It is doubtful that it would play it until a pull-out of Soviet troops is largely completed and most of the refugees have returned home.
- Pakistan's current policy on Afghanistan receives strong support from conservative religious parties at home and vital friends abroad, such as Saudi Arabia, China, and the US. Pakistan's strong stand on Afghanistan and its support for an active insurgency enables it to argue more effectively with the Saudis, the US, and China that it needs and deserves enhanced diplomatic, economic, and military support.

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[Redacted]

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January 5, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer for Near East South Asia

FROM: [Redacted] Chief, Pakistan/Afghanistan/Bangladesh Branch, NESAs, DDI

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SUBJECT: Afghanistan: Potential for Soviet Airfield Construction [Redacted]

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Attached is our response to the DCI's inquiry on the above subject. The response was prepared by [Redacted] of my branch and coordinated with SOVA. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Attachment: a/s

[Redacted]

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NESA M 83-10004CX

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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SUBJECT: Afghanistan: Potential for Soviet Airfield
Construction [Redacted]

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DDI/NESA/SO/P/[Redacted] (4 Jan 82)

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Afghanistan: Potential for Soviet Airfield Construction

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan clearly has grave strategic implications for the area and gives Moscow a potential base from which to further threaten Iran and Pakistan. Nonetheless, Soviet military activities in Afghanistan are currently aimed against the insurgency. In particular, the apparent intent of Soviet airfield improvements there, as

[REDACTED], is to increase the number of helicopters in Afghanistan and to expand the maintenance capabilities of Soviet air units engaged in operations against the insurgents. A key indicator of a shift in Soviet focus would be if Moscow began constructing an airfield in southwestern Afghanistan significantly closer to the Persian Gulf than existing bases. [REDACTED]

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A new Soviet airfield in southwestern Afghanistan would increase Soviet tactical air coverage of southeastern Iran, but we judge that it would give the Soviets few advantages in attacking targets in the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, or on the Arabian Peninsula. Of Soviet tactical aircraft, only the SU-24 Fencer tactical bomber would be within effective operational range of the Strait of Hormuz from an airfield built in southwestern Afghanistan. Assuming realistic combat mission profiles that anticipate possible US or Persian Gulf opposition, MIG-27 and SU-17 fighter-bombers would be unable to reach targets in the Persian Gulf from a new airfield and MIG-23 fighters would be operating at the limits of their effective range. Soviet medium bombers--including Backfire and Badger--would not require airbases in Afghanistan to be within range of the Persian Gulf, but could be based in the USSR. [REDACTED]

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Building a major airbase in southwestern Afghanistan would be costly, time-consuming, and confront nearly insurmountable logistical difficulties. Imagery indicates that the construction of new airbases in the USSR that are capable of sustaining tactical air operations requires a minimum of three years. Moreover, Soviet airbases are typically located along major lines of communication, usually including rail lines. There is virtually no logistical infrastructure in southwestern Afghanistan to support building a new airbase. The Soviets would need to build a road capable of supporting sustained traffic by heavy vehicles and equipment in order to transport the necessary building materials, particularly the large concrete slabs used for constructing runways. The distance from the existing main road connecting the cities of Qandahar and Farah with the USSR to the southwestern corner of Afghanistan is over 100 miles. [REDACTED]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted] Temporary
combat operations from an improvised airfield in southwestern
Afghanistan would also require logistics support probably beyond
the capabilities of the existing primitive road network in the
area. [Redacted]

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The Afghan insurgents would likely be able to harass but not
prevent the construction and operation of an airfield in
southwestern Afghanistan. The Soviets would need to assign at
least a ground force regiment to the area to suppress insurgent
activity. [Redacted]


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[Redacted]

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Effective Combat Radii of Selected Soviet Tactical Aircraft

MIG-23 fighter	800 km., optimum mission profile 400 km., probable mission profile
SU-17 fighter-bomber	600 km., optimum mission profile 300 km., probable mission profile
SU-24 tactical bomber	700-800 km., probable mission profile



Top Secret
[redacted]

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USSR-AFGHANISTAN: More Media Coverage

Increased attention by the Soviet media to Afghanistan probably reflects in part internal pressures for expanded coverage. [redacted]

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Since mid-December a series of articles have portrayed conditions in Afghanistan as difficult but improving. An authoritative editorial in *Pravda* on 2 January called the US the principal obstacle to a political settlement, and reiterated major elements of the USSR's position on the outlook for Afghanistan. Recent articles also have attacked China, Pakistan, the UK, West Germany, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iran for allegedly aiding the resistance. [redacted]

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Two articles in *Red Star* have described in detail the heroism of Soviet personnel in defending against two separate insurgent attacks on a convoy and an airfield. One revealed in passing that the USSR has suffered seven more casualties. [redacted]

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Comment: The coverage is designed in part to counter the increased attention the Western press pays to Afghanistan on the anniversary of the invasion. In addition, Soviet journalists periodically claim they are under pressure from the public, particularly families of men serving in Afghanistan, to provide more information about the conditions faced by Soviet troops. A recent Soviet radiobroadcast acknowledged receiving "many" letters asking why Soviet soldiers are still in Afghanistan. [redacted]

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The articles in *Red Star* illustrate the gradual expansion since 1981 of the practice of acknowledging intermittently the involvement of Soviet troops in the fighting. These articles suggest the leadership may be under pressure from elements of the military establishment to give more coverage to the valor of Soviet soldiers. [redacted]

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The USSR's coverage of Afghanistan, however, is still circumscribed by Moscow's concern to limit internal and international attention to the conflict. Soviet media continue to paint an unrealistic picture of conditions in Afghanistan. [redacted]

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The revelation of seven additional casualties raises Moscow's public tally of its losses in Afghanistan to 19—seven killed and 12 wounded. [redacted]

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

3 July 1985

Pakistani Attitudes Toward Afghanistan [redacted]

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Summary

President Zia is not wavering in his support for the Afghan insurgency and retains broad public backing for his Afghan policy. [redacted]

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[redacted] media criticism has increased in recent weeks. The political opposition also is trying to exploit the issue to revitalize itself and undermine the government. [redacted]

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* * * * *

Zia's program to restore gradually democratic rule to Pakistan has set the stage for an unprecedented public debate--much of it critical--on Islamabad's Afghan policy. The tone of the debate has been influenced in part by the continued high rate of cross-border air attacks and violations into Pakistani territory, some of which have resulted in Pakistani casualties. The visits by Zia and the Provincial Governor of the North-West Frontier to the village of Swir in the Chitral, the scene of a particularly deadly Afghan attack late last month, illustrate the government's sensitivity to the potential political fallout from the cross-border attacks. [redacted]

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This memorandum was prepared by [redacted] the Pakistan/Afghanistan/Bangladesh Branch, South Asia Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. Information as of 30 June 1985 was used in its preparation. Questions and comments should be directed to Chief, South Asia Division, at [redacted]

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State Dept. review completed

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[Redacted]

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Thanks in part to the relaxation of government controls, media criticism of Zia's Afghan policy has increased in recent weeks. Some newspaper editorials have questioned why the government has yet to respond to the Afghan attacks; others have charged that Zia is letting Pakistan be used by the United States as a pawn in its confrontation with the USSR in Afghanistan.

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[Redacted]

[Large Redacted Block]

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[Redacted] Pakistani intolerance of the large Afghan refugee presence has led to growing anti-American sentiment because of the belief that the United States is opposed to a political solution that would allow the repatriation of the refugees to Afghanistan. US diplomats in Karachi also note some public disenchantment with the refugee presence because of inflationary pressures and a sharp increase in crime rates.

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Opinion in the National Assembly

The newly elected National Assembly has the potential to become the main forum for views critical of Pakistan's--and US--policy toward Afghanistan, but the contentious debate that opposition politicians had hoped to generate during the recently concluded session of the Assembly did not materialize. The government kept the topic off the agenda and forcefully defended its support of the insurgents in response to questions. Those delegates who spoke out on Afghanistan all expressed concern about the number of cross-border attacks and the deteriorating security situation in the border areas. Zia's critics also accused the government of risking further escalation of the conflict. Other

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[REDACTED]

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members, however, supported the government, and a few even urged the government to respond more forcefully to future Afghan air attacks. Contrary to expectations, the demand for direct talks with Kabul to settle the Afghanistan conflict was not widely voiced in the Assembly. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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Zia's Views

In our judgment, Zia's Afghanistan policy is based on what he sees as the need to prevent the Soviets from controlling Afghanistan and using it as a base to threaten and destabilize Pakistan. He also knows that Pakistani support to the Afghan insurgents has helped Islamabad secure increased military and financial assistance from the United States, China, Saudi Arabia, and Western Europe. [REDACTED]

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We believe Zia's concern with containing the spread of Soviet power and influence is heightened by Moscow's close relations with New Delhi. US Embassy reporting indicates Zia and senior Pakistani officials fear that India and the USSR are conspiring to weaken and neutralize Pakistan so that its policies do not threaten their interests. [REDACTED]

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Zia believes that the United States and Pakistan share a common interest in opposing Soviet control of Afghanistan. He probably is not concerned that a US-Soviet dialogue on Afghanistan will undermine support for Pakistan and its Afghan policy. [REDACTED]

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We believe public debate will grow, particularly after martial law ends, and complicate Zia's decision making on Afghanistan. Zia is sensitive to charges that his policies serve

[REDACTED]

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US--not Pakistan's--interests and undermine Pakistan's security by increasing Soviet and Indian hostility. In this regard, Zia views the UN-sponsored indirect talks with Afghanistan at Geneva as a means to show diplomatic flexibility, to deflect domestic criticism of his support of the resistance, and to put political pressure on Moscow. [REDACTED]

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Zia is unlikely to change his policy solely because of growing public disenchantment. Zia's perception of US support and reliability, the level of Soviet military pressure along the border with Afghanistan, the state of relations with India and Pakistan's economic well-being will all be considerations in Zia's calculations. [REDACTED]

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[Redacted]

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SUBJECT: Pakistani Attitudes Toward Afghanistan [Redacted]

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SUBJECT: Pakistani Attitudes Toward Afghanistan



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National Intelligence Estimate

The Soviet Presence in Afghanistan: Implications for the Regional Powers and the United States

Key Judgments

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**THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGIONAL
POWERS AND THE UNITED STATES**

KEY JUDGMENTS

The full text of this Estimate
is being published separately
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The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps

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SCOPE NOTE

This Estimate assesses the implications of a continued Soviet military presence in Afghanistan through 1990 for the regional powers—Pakistan, India, Iran, and the Arab world—and for the United States. It addresses the implications of the Soviet invasion in terms of the following questions:

- How has the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan influenced the regional powers' strategic perspectives and threat assessments?
- What impact has the Soviet presence in Afghanistan had on regional rivalries, especially that between India and Pakistan?
- What options do the Soviets have to manipulate the policies and internal politics of the regional states, and what are Moscow's prospects for success?
- How would domestic instability or changes in government of the regional states affect their policies toward Afghanistan and the Soviets?
- How are US interests affected by the policies of the regional powers, and by Soviet attempts to manipulate the domestic politics and conflicts of these regional powers?

The Estimate examines Moscow's policy options in Afghanistan only as far as they affect regional actors and is not intended to be predictive of all aspects of Soviet regional policies through 1990 or beyond.

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KEY JUDGMENTS

After nearly 150 years of intermittent competition between Russia and Western powers in Central Asia and Afghanistan, the Soviet Union now occupies Afghanistan with a large army, is strategically positioned between Iran and Pakistan, is the only great power on the ground militarily in the region, and is 300 miles away from the Indian Ocean.¹

Moscow's efforts to consolidate Soviet control over Afghanistan will increase the potential for regional instability and conflict during the next five years. The Soviets will continue their efforts to move events in the region in their favor and will increase the pressure on regional actors through military and political means as well as intimidation and subversion.

Should the Soviets consolidate their control over Afghanistan, they will enhance their strategic and regional position and place themselves in a stronger position for pursuing other regional objectives at the expense of US interests. Even if Moscow would only gain modest strategic military advantages during the next five years, military or political success toward consolidating their position would place the Soviets in a better position to intimidate Afghanistan's neighbors and to meddle in their affairs. All the regional powers—including India and the Persian Gulf countries—would have to take into consideration the proximity of Soviet power and Moscow's demonstrated willingness to use force to achieve Soviet objectives.

Regional Reaction to Invasion

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has created a new strategic situation that has already had a major impact on regional politics and on the strategic interests of powers outside Southwest Asia:

- The invasion sparked an Afghan insurgency that has grown in size and effectiveness and which prevents the Soviets from consolidating their control.
- Pakistan, as a result of providing vital sanctuary and support for the Afghan insurgents and supporting US objectives in the region, is now in confrontation with the Soviets.

¹ The Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, is in agreement with this Estimate but believes it important to point out that the Soviet efforts to consolidate control in Afghanistan will be very difficult during the five-year period of the Estimate and will most likely have negative effects on the Soviet Union's position throughout the region and its ability to enhance its strategic position. Much of this is spelled out in the remainder of the Key Judgments.

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- The Soviet threat to Pakistan from Afghanistan provided strong impetus to the resurrection of US-Pakistani security ties that now include closer strategic cooperation and significant US military assistance.
- US military aid for Pakistan has in turn increased India's suspicions of both US and Pakistani intentions, has contributed to greater Indo-Pakistani tensions, and has led to a closer—though still limited—convergence of some Indian and Soviet interests in weakening Pakistan.
- The invasion set back Soviet efforts to improve relations with the Arab states of the Persian Gulf region and with China. Saudi Arabia and China both provide aid to the Afghan insurgents through Pakistan, and the Saudis have increased their assistance to Islamabad.

The very process by which Moscow attempts to further consolidate its power in Afghanistan will have ongoing strategic impact on the region.

Prospects and Implications of Soviet Consolidation

There is a range of opinion within the Intelligence Community about whether the Soviet Union will be able to consolidate its position in Afghanistan beyond the period of this Estimate. If the Soviet Union can further consolidate its position, Moscow's prospects for achieving long-term strategic objectives in the region would increase:

- Firmly establishing Afghanistan within Moscow's "empire" would demonstrate the Soviets' resolve and increase fears among regional states about Soviet expansionism.
- Moscow would be in a stronger geographic position to further expand its political influence in the region, in some cases at the expense of US influence.

Within the time frame of this Estimate, the USSR will steadily improve its military infrastructure in Afghanistan to support its regional defense requirements and ability to project power. Major improvements in air and logistic facilities and the deployment of additional forces would be essential for the Soviets to undertake and sustain large-scale operations from Afghanistan into Pakistan or Iran.

Over the next five years, the Soviets' improvements in the logistic infrastructure in Afghanistan will improve their capabilities against the resistance and could also support Soviet military operations against Iran

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and Pakistan. Over the longer term the military significance of Afghanistan as a forward base will grow. However:

- The difficult terrain, rudimentary transportation network, and poor logistic facilities in Afghanistan, together with the range limitations of tactical aircraft currently in the Soviet inventory, limit the strategic military advantages that the Soviets would derive from victory in Afghanistan in the near term.
- Logistic and terrain difficulties would also limit the use of Afghanistan as a forward base for a land invasion of Pakistan and, to a lesser extent, Iran.
- However, beginning in the late 1980s, expected improvements in Soviet tactical aviation—including an air-refueling capability—would allow aircraft launched from Afghanistan to support Soviet military operations in the Persian Gulf region, improving existing capabilities.

Military and Diplomatic Costs to Moscow

So far, however, the invasion has resulted in significant military and diplomatic costs for Moscow that offset potential strategic gains. The regional reaction to the Soviet invasion and subsequent occupation of Afghanistan has been uniformly negative. This has given the United States an opportunity to make some concrete, though still modest, gains in its relations with several of these states. Continued US interest and commitment, appropriate to the variety of states in question, is perceived by the regional states as critical to their continued opposition to the Soviets in Afghanistan.

To date, Moscow's invasion has incurred the following military and diplomatic costs:

- Five years after the invasion, the Soviets and their puppet regime in Kabul still do not control most of Afghanistan, and their combat losses—while still relatively small—are increasing.
- The invasion helped provoke an enhanced US commitment to regional security, complicated Indo-Soviet relations, and has rekindled suspicions about Soviet ambitions in the Arab world.
- US military planning and force structuring for contingencies in the Persian Gulf have been given increased impetus by the invasion.

Projected Soviet Policy in Afghanistan

The judgments in this Estimate are based on our belief that, during the next five years, the Soviets will neither withdraw from Afghanistan,²

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nor succeed in reducing significantly the level of Afghan resistance. The USSR may marginally improve its political military position in Afghanistan and will take whatever steps are necessary to avoid a severe deterioration of its military position in Afghanistan.

Specifically, we believe that:

- The Soviets will not withdraw from Afghanistan because such a move would represent a clear failure of Soviet policy and force of arms both at home and abroad.
- The Soviets will not be willing to make the type of concessions that would permit a political compromise acceptable to the Afghan resistance.
- The Afghan resistance will increase its effectiveness against the Soviets as it becomes better armed and trained.
- Unless the Soviets are faced with a serious deterioration in their military position, we still expect them to make continued incremental increases—of perhaps 10,000 men per year—in their troop strength. Should resistance capabilities improve significantly and the Soviets face a deteriorating military situation, however, they could consider even larger increases in troop strength and stepped-up pressure against Pakistan.
- Nevertheless, we do not believe the Soviets will opt for a massive reinforcement of the approximately 115,000 men now in Afghanistan because of the likely diplomatic, economic, and military costs. To use military force alone to crush the resistance would, in our judgment, require 400,000 to 500,000 troops.

Pakistan

The Soviets will concentrate on political and military efforts to stop the flow of men and supplies across Afghanistan's borders with Pakistan. To accomplish these objectives, the Soviets probably will:

- Increase cross-border air and artillery strikes into Pakistan and probably support limited ground incursions in an attempt to undermine the Pakistani public's support for the Afghan resistance and confidence in President Zia.
- Step up subversion to weaken the Zia regime and try to help a pliable civilian government—which would be more accommodating to Moscow's interests—come to power in Islamabad.

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- Seek ways to reinvigorate Baluchi, Pushtun, and Sindhi separatist tendencies in order to threaten the unity of Pakistan.

- Foster tensions between India and Pakistan.

Soviet policy choices will be affected by Moscow's view of Pakistan's political stability and weaknesses, US-Pakistani ties, Indo-Soviet relations, and its own limited resources in Pakistan:

- Moscow would view Zia as more vulnerable to pressure if he were to become seriously weakened politically.

- The Soviets would be wary that too tough a policy could strengthen Zia, as well as US-Pakistani security ties, and possibly lead to a confrontation with the United States.

- Further, Moscow would not want its actions against Pakistan to result in major strains in its relations with India, and especially not in closer Indian ties to the United States.

Pakistan's resistance to greater Soviet pressure will depend principally on its perceptions of US support:

- Zia's Afghan policies are predicated on tying the Soviets down in Afghanistan in the interests of Pakistan's own security. His willingness to run the risks of increased tensions with the USSR reflect in part his hope that the United States will reciprocate with a full commitment to his regime—against India as well as against the Soviets.

- The Pakistanis will continue to press for additional arms and would expect more direct US military help—including logistic support and possibly a show of force—if the Soviets conduct cross-border operations.

As long as Zia remains in power and so long as he feels he can rely on US support, Pakistan is unlikely to alter its policy on Afghanistan or reduce its ties to the United States. However, a major internal crisis or an erosion of public support for the Afghan cause might compel Islamabad to alter its policies even if it had US backing:

- Another military regime might be more likely than Zia to adopt a conciliatory policy toward Moscow and Kabul.

- A leftist civilian government—which is least likely to come to power in the next five years—would be most willing to reach agreement with Moscow and Kabul.

Moscow's efforts to bully Pakistan into changing its tough policy on Afghanistan have so far been counterproductive and are likely to face

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continuing difficulties. The threat to Pakistan from an alien and "anti-Islamic" Soviet force in Afghanistan has worked to:

- Strengthen national unity by rallying Pakistanis to a government confronting a foreign force—the threat serves to help Zia retain control.
- Strengthen Pakistan's security and economic relationships with the United States, China, and the conservative Persian Gulf Arabs, with visible benefits of economic assistance and improvement in Pakistan's armed forces.
- Complicate Soviet-directed subversive efforts.
- Defuse the Pushtunistan separatist issue.
- Encourage Pakistan to seek better relations with India.

A Pakistani accommodation with Moscow would have major strategic implications for the United States:

- The Afghan resistance would be severely weakened without Pakistan as a sanctuary and supply base.
- A much wider expansion of Soviet control over Afghanistan would be virtually assured, although some level of resistance would continue.
- Pakistan would become less supportive overall of US strategic interests.

India

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi would like both the USSR and the United States to end their involvement in South Asia. At least over the near term, however, the consequences of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan—notably US security assistance to Pakistan—may serve as a basis for the de facto convergence of some Indian and Soviet objectives. India and the Soviet Union both want, for different reasons:

- Weakening of Pakistani security ties to the United States.
- Establishment of a more pliant government in Pakistan.
- An end to the Afghan insurgency.

The Soviets have tried to heighten India's suspicions about Pakistan's intentions and its security relationship with the United States in order to foster Indo-Pakistani tensions and heighten New Delhi's dependence on Moscow. In the Soviet view, conflict between India and Pakistan would work toward solving Moscow's Afghan problem and would give Moscow opportunities to strengthen its position in South Asia.

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The Soviets would almost certainly condone even an Indian preemptive strike against Pakistan's nuclear facilities in the belief that it served Moscow's interests by weakening Pakistan. However, a preemptive Indian attack on Pakistani nuclear facilities is unlikely in the near term.

Even without Soviet encouragement, India's suspicions of Pakistan and the United States and its dependence on Soviet arms will persist and could even increase as a result of closer US-Pakistani security cooperation. Some in New Delhi believe this cooperation has already acquired a dynamic independent of Afghanistan. Nonetheless, India is likely to become increasingly concerned about long-range Soviet intentions in the region, and could find itself moving toward confrontation with the Soviets if Pakistan were effectively neutralized:

- New Delhi regards Pakistan as a strategic buffer against the USSR and would oppose Moscow's efforts to dominate Pakistan.
- New Delhi and Moscow could find themselves supporting rival factions within Pakistan.
- The Indians would seek to significantly reduce their dependence on Moscow and reorder their strategic relationship with the USSR, the United States, and China if they perceived Soviet ambitions as extending beyond Afghanistan toward the subcontinent.

Iran

Soviet relations with Iran probably will be more determined by bilateral issues other than Afghanistan. Nonetheless:

- Soviet pressure on Iran probably will intensify if Tehran increases its support for the Afghan resistance. Greater Soviet pressure would be unlikely, however, to cause Tehran to change its Afghan policies.
- Iran might increase its aid to the insurgents once its war with Iraq is over, but Iran's support is not nearly as crucial to the resistance as Pakistan's.
- Should Pakistan cease support to the Mujahedin, Iranian support would become critical to the survival of the insurgency but would not begin to replace current supply levels through Pakistan.

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Arab States

Soviet success in controlling Afghanistan would heighten Arab concerns about Moscow's intentions in the Middle East. However, the potential for US-Arab strategic cooperation—and Arab views of Soviet policies—will be influenced much more by Arab-Israeli and Gulf war issues than by the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states will continue to back Pakistan in its support for the Afghan resistance.

China

Beijing views the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as an ominous extension of Moscow's military assertiveness that threatens China's broader strategic interests. China will continue to support Islamabad's role in aiding the insurgents, but has limited potential for helping Pakistan in the face of greater Soviet pressure. The Chinese, however, would not want Pakistani policy to result in successful Soviet efforts to neutralize Pakistan because Islamabad's role as Beijing's key South Asian ally is even more important to China than its role in opposing the Soviets in Afghanistan.

Implications for the United States

Pakistan is likely to continue to oppose the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan as long as it perceives it has continued strong US support. Even Iran, which may feel compelled to move to improve its relations with the Soviets, will continue to support the withdrawal of Soviet troops from its neighbor. For the new Indian leadership, however, the US-Pakistani security relationship will hamper any reassessment by India of its public position on Afghanistan.

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